Pakistani Public Opinion Toward the United States (2020–2025)

Overall Sentiment and National Trends

Pakistani public opinion toward the United States remains overwhelmingly negative in recent years.

Favorability ratings of the U.S. have consistently been very low – typically well under 20% – and a majority of Pakistanis view the U.S. as an adversary rather than a friend.

In fact, surveys have long shown that roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of Pakistanis consider the U.S. an “enemy” of their country. This figure spiked around the early 2010s (peaking at about 74% in 2012) amid heightened tensions in the War on Terror , and it has remained high through the mid-2020s. For example, a Gallup Pakistan poll in 2022 found 72% of Pakistanis still characterized the United States as an enemy, underscoring persistent distrust . Correspondingly, genuinely “favorable” opinions of America are scarce – by some accounts only on the order of 10–15% of the public in recent years . (For context, the only recent time U.S. favorability even rose above one-quarter of Pakistanis was in 2006, when it hit 27% after major U.S. aid for earthquake relief – a short-lived uptick .) Overall sentiment toward the U.S. has thus remained at rock-bottom levels, with a large majority of Pakistanis holding an unfavorable view of the country and its role in Pakistan.

Notable changes over time: Anti-American sentiment surged during the 2000s and early 2010s as Pakistan became a front-line state in the U.S.-led “War on Terror.” By 2011–2012 – after events like the U.S. raid killing Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and NATO airstrikes on Pakistani troops – negative views hit record highs (nearly three-quarters calling the U.S. an enemy) . Thereafter, there was a slight easing of hostility around the mid-2010s as direct U.S. military involvement in the region receded. Pew surveys in 2014, for instance, noted a small decline in Pakistani unfavorable opinions of the U.S. (a “somewhat less negative” stance) as Washington prepared to withdraw most troops from Afghanistan . Pakistanis broadly approved of the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan – in 2014, 46% said the troop withdrawal was a “good thing” vs. only 11% “bad” – which briefly improved the U.S. image. However, any goodwill gains proved fragile. By the late 2010s and early 2020s, Pakistan–U.S. relations hit new snags (from U.S. aid cuts under President Trump to Pakistan’s perceived snub in the Afghan peace process), and public sentiment remained as negative as ever. Even the U.S. exit from Afghanistan in 2021 did not noticeably soften Pakistani attitudes toward America in the long run . In 2022, after former Prime Minister Imran Khan alleged a U.S.-backed “conspiracy” against him, anti-U.S. rhetoric again surged in Pakistani politics – tapping into an already well-established reservoir of public distrust . In short, while Pakistani opinion of the U.S. has fluctuated marginally with world events, the key trend is continuity: deep skepticism and resentment of the United States have persisted into 2025, with only minor ebbs and flows.

Regional Differences in Attitudes

There are some notable differences in anti-American sentiment across Pakistan’s regions, though negative views are prevalent everywhere. Historically, the provinces that bore the brunt of U.S. counterterrorism operations – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP, formerly North-West Frontier Province) and the adjacent Tribal Areas (former FATA) along the Afghan border – have harbored especially strong anti-U.S. feelings. Residents of these western regions have directly experienced U.S. drone strikes and military incursions, which intensified anger at the United States. For example, Pew’s polling in 2009 (during a peak period of drone activity) found only 9% of respondents in the NWFP held a favorable view of the U.S., the lowest among regions . In Balochistan (another western province bordering Afghanistan and Iran), U.S. popularity has also been extremely low – though nationally representative polls often could not extensively survey FATA or parts of Balochistan due to insecurity, the prevailing sentiment there has been described as fiercely anti-American. Many in these areas viewed U.S. actions as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and blamed the U.S. war effort for violence on their soil. As a result, opposition to America and its counterterrorism campaign tends to be most intense in Pakistan’s Pashtun-majority northwest (KP and the former FATA).

By contrast, Punjab and Sindh, Pakistan’s two largest provinces, have at times shown comparatively less hostility toward the U.S. – though opinion is still largely negative. Punjab, with over half the country’s population, has been a stronghold of Pakistani nationalist sentiment and the military establishment; many Punjabis are critical of U.S. policies (especially those seen as favoring India or undermining Pakistan), and surveys indicate majority-unfavorable views in Punjab in line with the national average . Sindh province has occasionally reported slightly higher favorability towards the U.S. than other regions. Pew’s 2009 survey, for instance, recorded 28% favorable sentiment in Sindh, notably higher than in Punjab (13%) or NWFP (9%) at that time . Analysts attributed this to Sindh’s political leanings – it is the base of the center-left Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which traditionally advocates working with the U.S., and urban Sindh (Karachi) is more exposed to Western commerce and culture. Even so, most Sindhis were still anti-American in that poll, and subsequent years have not produced a pro-U.S. majority in any province. In recent Gallup Pakistan data, anti-U.S. opinion remains the majority stance across all provinces, with only marginal regional variation in degree. If anything, the urban centers (e.g. Karachi in Sindh, Lahore in Punjab) tend to be a bit more open to engagement with the U.S. than Pakistan’s rural or frontier areas, where conservative and religious influences are stronger. Overall, however, every region of Pakistan exhibits predominantly negative attitudes toward the United States – the difference is that in some areas the skepticism is somewhat softer, whereas in others (especially the conflict-affected northwest) it is almost uniformly harsh.

Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan cuts across social classes and educational levels – it is not confined to any single demographic, although the tone and reasoning can differ. Polling breakdowns by income or education are not always publicly available, but analyses suggest that even the urban, educated elite harbor distrust of U.S. intentions. In fact, moderate and liberal segments of Pakistani society (often English-educated, consumerist, and familiar with Western culture) have been frustrated with the United States on issues like drone strikes. Brookings analyst Madiha Afzal noted that many well-educated, Western-exposed Pakistanis grew outraged by the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. counterterrorism tactics – for example, seeing America mourn its own victims (e.g. school shootings) while Pakistani civilian casualties of U.S. drones were downplayed as “bug splats” . Such educated Pakistanis may appreciate aspects of American culture, but they resent what they view as America’s disregard for Pakistani lives and sovereignty. In her assessment, U.S. drone strikes were “infuriating the more moderate and liberal segments” of Pakistan’s population – a striking observation that even those inclined to be sympathetic to the West were alienated by U.S. policies . This indicates that higher socio-economic status or global exposure does not necessarily translate into pro-U.S. sentiment in Pakistan; if anything, educated Pakistanis might voice their anti-Americanism in terms of moral and legal principles (sovereignty, human rights) rather than conspiracy theories, but the negative attitude remains.

At the same time, lower-income and less-educated Pakistanis also demonstrate strong anti-U.S. orientations, often fueled by populist narratives. Among the general public, it is common to hear that the U.S. cannot be trusted – a view shared by village laborers and urban professionals alike. Conspiracy theories about American intentions (e.g. that the U.S. wants to destabilize Pakistan or seize its nuclear assets) find a receptive audience among those with limited access to nuanced information. Widespread grievances such as Pakistan’s economic struggles or security woes are frequently laid, at least in part, at Washington’s doorstep in popular discourse. This implies that the working classes and rural populations are just as skeptical of the U.S. as the elite, though their perspective might be shaped more by local media or clerical rhetoric. For instance, religious and nationalist organizations have actively spread anti-U.S. sentiment at the grassroots level – rallies by Islamist parties often blame America for Pakistan’s problems, resonating with poorer, religiously devout communities. Pew surveys have previously found that followers of Islamist parties or those favoring strict Sharia law tend to be especially hostile toward the U.S. For example, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) have made anti-Americanism a core theme, capitalizing on public anger over U.S. actions in the Muslim world . Consequently, high religiosity often correlates with greater anti-U.S. fervor. Pakistanis who pray regularly, support conservative clerics, or otherwise prioritize religious identity are typically more likely to view the U.S. as a hostile power (seen as anti-Islam or aligned with anti-Muslim forces). By contrast, more secular-minded Pakistanis might be somewhat less vitriolic, though even they largely mistrust U.S. policies. It’s important to note that anti-Americanism in Pakistan is a mainstream phenomenon spanning most demographic groups – as one 2022 analysis summed up, an “overwhelming majority” across the board holds unfavorable views, and this has been a perennial challenge for U.S.–Pakistan relations . The nuances lie in the motivations: the devout poor may cite religious solidarity (with Afghanistan, Palestine, etc.) or sovereignty, whereas the educated critics cite issues of principles and perceived double standards – but both converge in a negative appraisal of the United States.

Views on U.S.–Pakistan Relations and Trust Issues

Given these attitudes, it is perhaps no surprise that Pakistanis are deeply cynical about U.S.–Pakistan relations. Polls show that few Pakistanis consider the United States a reliable partner. In a 2012 Pew survey, only 13% of Pakistanis felt relations with the U.S. had improved in recent years (and that was a sharp decline from an already low 29% the year before) . Most people see the bilateral relationship as troubled or deteriorating. Moreover, the desire to improve ties has waned among the public: in 2011, 60% said it was important for Pakistan to have better relations with the U.S., but by 2012 that proportion fell to 45% . In other words, as of the early 2020s many Pakistanis are ambivalent or even indifferent about mending fences with Washington – reflecting a loss of faith that such efforts would be reciprocated or beneficial. When asked whether the U.S. considers Pakistan’s interests when making policy, a majority of Pakistanis say “not much” or “not at all.” Surveys have consistently found that fewer than one-quarter of Pakistanis believe the U.S. takes Pakistan’s interests into account; in one Pew poll, only 22% thought America cared even a fair amount about countries like Pakistan . The prevailing view is that the U.S. will act unilaterally in its own interest, even at Pakistan’s expense.

This trust deficit is encapsulated by stark polling choices: Pakistanis more often label the U.S. an “enemy” than an “ally”. In multiple surveys over the past decade, roughly 60–75% have said the U.S. is an enemy of Pakistan, whereas typically only around 10% or less call it a partner or friend . (For example, Pew found 64% calling America an enemy vs. just 9% saying it is a partner in 2009 ; by 2012, 74% said enemy vs. 11% partner – an extremely lopsided ratio that persists today.) Even as recently as 2022, roughly 72% of Pakistanis viewed the U.S. as mostly an adversary . Such perceptions are reinforced by geopolitical grievances – many Pakistanis accuse the U.S. of favoring arch-rival India in regional affairs, a belief borne out by polls: a majority thinks U.S. policies tilt toward India against Pakistan . Washington’s closer ties with New Delhi fuel the narrative in Pakistan that the U.S. cannot be trusted to support Pakistani interests (for instance, on the Kashmir dispute or in regional security). History also looms large: older generations recall how the U.S. “abandoned” Pakistan after the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s, leading to enduring wariness that America is a fickle ally. In Pakistani public discourse, the U.S. is often portrayed as unreliable – supportive when convenient and punitive otherwise – and this is reflected in opinion surveys. Even when Pakistan was a major non-NATO ally during the 2000s, public opinion remained skeptical of American intentions. By the 2020s, with the U.S. perceived as having largely withdrawn strategic attention from Pakistan, only a minority of Pakistanis express optimism about the two countries’ relationship. Instead, the common sentiment is that Pakistan must be cautious in dealing with the U.S., which many view as a powerful but fundamentally self-interested and even hostile force. The consequence is a serious image problem: as the Stimson Center noted in 2022, anti-Americanism is held by an “overwhelming majority” of Pakistanis, complicating any U.S. foreign policy goals in the country .

Nonetheless, it’s worth noting that Pakistanis do differentiate between government-to-government relations and what they desire in terms of cooperation. Even amid negative feelings, polls show a segment of the public still wants pragmatic engagement with the U.S. – for trade, aid, or global issues – if it can be achieved on more equal footing. For instance, even in 2012, nearly half (45%) said improving relations was at least “somewhat important” , indicating that many Pakistanis would welcome better ties if trust could be rebuilt. And earlier, in 2009, a narrow majority (53%) said it was important that the two countries work to improve relations . These numbers have dropped over time, but they underscore that Pakistani anti-Americanism is often pragmatic rather than absolute: people are angry at and distrustful of U.S. policies, yet some would support rapprochement if their core concerns (sovereignty, respect, mutual benefit) were addressed. Unfortunately, in practice those concerns have often gone unresolved, perpetuating the cycle of mutual suspicion.

Opinions on U.S. Foreign Aid and Economic Influence

Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid (both civilian and military) over the decades, but Pakistani public opinion toward this aid is surprisingly critical. Rather than engendering goodwill, American assistance is frequently viewed with suspicion. Survey data from the early 2010s – a time when the U.S. rolled out the multi-billion-dollar Kerry-Lugar aid package – showed that Pakistanis doubted the intentions and impact of U.S. aid. In 2012, Pew found roughly 4 in 10 Pakistanis believed American economic and military aid “is actually having a negative impact” on Pakistan, whereas only about 1 in 10 thought U.S. aid is having a positive effect . In concrete terms, only 12% of Pakistanis surveyed said U.S. economic aid was mostly good for their country, and an even smaller 8% saw U.S. military aid positively . Far more people felt that these aid flows either accomplish nothing or actively harm Pakistan – for example, by creating dependency, fostering corruption, or advancing a hidden U.S. agenda. This cynical view has been steady: Pakistanis often assert that U.S. aid comes with strings attached and is designed to buy influence rather than genuinely help Pakistan. Even humanitarian assistance is not immune to doubts. While American disaster relief (such as after the 2005 earthquake or 2010 floods) earned brief appreciation, many Pakistanis quickly revert to skepticism about aid motives once the immediate crisis passes. It is commonly argued in media and politics that U.S. aid undermines Pakistan’s sovereignty or that it is a tool to “pressure” Pakistan into complying with U.S. demands (be it counterterrorism cooperation or economic reforms). This narrative has significantly blunted whatever soft power benefit aid might have delivered.

Crucially, a large number of Pakistanis believe that Pakistan doesn’t truly benefit from its partnership with the U.S. in economic terms. When asked to evaluate the balance sheet of the relationship, Pakistanis often point to perceived negatives (like the fallout of war or the conditions on loans) overshadowing any positives (like trade access or aid funds). For instance, a 2012 poll recorded that 38% of Pakistanis said U.S. economic aid had a negative impact, while only 12% said it had a positive impact . Similarly, 40%+ said American military aid was hurting Pakistan, with a mere 8% believing it helped . This underscores a remarkable lack of faith in American assistance programs. Even initiatives explicitly meant to win hearts and minds – like development projects under USAID – often fail to change the dominant narrative. In Pakistani eyes, the costs of alignment with the U.S. (terrorism blowback, conditionality, loss of autonomy) are seen as outweighing the financial gains. It does not help that Pakistani leaders themselves have sent mixed messages: while quietly accepting U.S. funds, officials have publicly complained about “peanuts” aid or about sovereignty violations, reinforcing public skepticism.

In terms of broader economic ties, Pakistanis are ambivalent about U.S. influence. The United States is one of Pakistan’s top export markets and a source of investment, but China has far outstripped the U.S. in the public’s economic imagination. Surveys consistently show that Pakistanis regard China as their preferred economic partner: for example, an overwhelming 84% had a favorable view of China in 2009 , and about the same proportion consider China a partner to Pakistan – a stark contrast to perceptions of the U.S. When asked which world power best supports Pakistan’s economy, many Pakistanis point to China’s infrastructure investments (like the CPEC projects) rather than U.S. aid. By the 2020s, China’s positive ratings in Pakistani public opinion hover around 75–80%, while the U.S.’s hover in the teens . This indicates that U.S. economic soft power is relatively weak in Pakistan, despite decades of aid. Even though the U.S. still conducts significant trade with Pakistan, few Pakistanis credit America with improving their economic situation. If anything, there is a narrative that American-backed institutions (like the IMF) impose painful austerity on Pakistan. For example, as Pakistan has struggled with debt and IMF bailouts in recent years, populist rhetoric has occasionally cast blame on the U.S. (as a dominant IMF member) for Pakistan’s economic woes. In summary, public opinion data show little gratitude for U.S. economic engagement: only a small minority believes American aid or investment has helped Pakistan’s economy, while a large share see it as self-serving or even harmful . Improving this perception remains a challenge – Pakistanis would likely need to see more tangible, unconditional benefits before changing their views. As of 2025, the trend is that Pakistan’s populace looks far more favorably upon economic involvement from China, Turkey, or even Middle Eastern allies, whereas U.S. aid is viewed through a lens of mistrust.

Cultural Influence and Soft Power Perceptions

On the cultural front, the United States wields a complex influence in Pakistan. American culture – from Hollywood movies and music to fast-food chains – is widely present in urban Pakistan, especially among youth. Western franchises like McDonald’s, KFC, and Pizza Hut have become commonplace in Pakistani cities , and English-language media (films, TV shows, social media content) is consumed by a significant segment of the population. This American cultural footprint means that many Pakistanis are familiar with, and even enjoy, elements of U.S. pop culture and lifestyle. In cosmopolitan circles, wearing Western fashion brands or watching the latest Marvel movie is not uncommon. However, this cultural affinity does not straightforwardly translate into positive feelings about the U.S. as a country – in fact, it coexists with political resentment. Pakistani public opinion generally separates American people and culture from American government policies. Surveys have found that Pakistanis tend to view “Americans” (the people) a bit less unfavorably than they view the “United States” as a nation – but even so, favorable opinions of American people were only around 20% in one Pew poll . The majority still had a negative impression of Americans in that survey, albeit not as overwhelmingly negative as their view of the U.S. state . This suggests a degree of cultural distancing: Pakistanis might like American products or admire certain values in theory, yet they remain highly skeptical of U.S. intentions.

It is also true that cultural influence from the West has its own backlash. Conservative segments of society view the spread of Western culture with alarm, seeing it as an intrusion on Islamic values. There have been periodic protests or campaigns in Pakistan against “cultural imperialism” – for example, denunciations of Valentine’s Day (considered a Western import) or of co-educational schools teaching “Western” curriculums. Right-wing and religious leaders sometimes conflate cultural and political opposition to the West, arguing that Pakistan must resist American culture just as it should resist American political pressure. However, these hardline views are not the primary driver of Pakistani anti-Americanism. As one analysis noted, Pakistan’s anti-American sentiment is “not exclusive to radicals” and isn’t mainly about rejecting American culture or capitalism . In fact, Pakistan has no strong nationwide anti-American ideological movement (e.g., there’s little communist or extreme leftist sentiment against American capitalism). Instead, the core grievances are political and security-related. Most Pakistanis are not fundamentally against engaging with American society – many have relatives in the U.S. or would send their children to study there if possible – but they harbor distrust due to policy disputes. In essence, U.S. soft power finds some foothold among Pakistani citizens (through media, education, and consumer goods), but it has not overcome the hard power resentments. Positive cultural impressions are outweighed by negative political impressions. A Pakistani might love watching the NBA or listening to American pop, yet still firmly believe that “America is against us.” The Pew Global Attitudes surveys in the past have highlighted this nuance: large majorities disliked U.S. foreign policy and leadership, even as smaller numbers acknowledged American scientific and educational achievements.

One area of cultural influence is education and exchange: the U.S. has funded scholarship programs and cultural exchanges (e.g., Fulbright scholarships, student programs) that expose young Pakistanis to America. These programs have anecdotally helped improve individual perceptions, but at the mass level their impact is limited. While participants often return with more nuanced views, they form a tiny fraction of society. The broader public still sees American cultural influence mainly through the prism of media and the internet, which can sometimes reinforce stereotypes (both positive and negative). American ideals of democracy and freedom do inspire some Pakistanis, but many others perceive hypocrisy – for instance, they question U.S. commitment to those ideals abroad, given American support for dictators in Pakistan’s history or perceived biases against Muslims. Thus, American cultural soft power faces an uphill battle in Pakistan’s public opinion climate. Enjoyment of American culture lives alongside a prevailing narrative that American values are not practiced toward Pakistan. Overall, cultural ties have not mitigated Pakistanis’ strategic suspicions: polls confirm that anti-Americanism in Pakistan is driven more by policy grievances than by a rejection of American culture per se . The U.S. “brand” remains tainted in Pakistan despite the ubiquity of Levi’s jeans and Marvel superheroes. The challenge for U.S. soft power is bridging this gap – as of 2025, familiarity with American culture has grown, but it has not translated into significantly improved favorability toward the United States.

Attitudes on U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts (Drone Strikes and the “War on Terror”)

One of the most salient factors shaping Pakistani views of the U.S. has been American counterterrorism policy on Pakistan’s western frontier – namely, the drone strike campaign and the broader War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Public opinion on these subjects is strongly negative. Poll after poll throughout the 2010s showed that Pakistanis overwhelmingly opposed U.S. drone strikes against extremist targets on Pakistani soil. Even though these strikes were aimed at militant leaders (Al-Qaeda, Taliban factions), the dominant perception in Pakistan was that drones killed too many innocent civilians and violated Pakistan’s sovereignty. In a 2011 Pew survey, among Pakistanis who had heard about the drone strikes, a remarkable 95% described the drone attacks as a “bad” or “very bad” thing . Fully 91% of those informed respondents agreed that drone strikes “kill too many innocent people,” and 69% disagreed that the strikes were necessary for Pakistan’s security . These are overwhelming figures, indicating near-consensus disapproval. Nationally representative polls consistently reflected this sentiment. For instance, around 2012, roughly 3 in 4 Pakistanis (74%) said U.S. drone strikes mostly kill innocent civilians . In the same vein, Pew found in 2012 that only 17% of Pakistanis approved of U.S. drone strikes against extremist leaders even if they were conducted in partnership with Pakistan’s government – meaning over 80% disapproved of drones under virtually any circumstance . Such broad opposition stems from multiple sources: reported civilian casualties, national pride/sovereignty concerns, and a general resentment of the U.S. military operating unilaterally on Pakistani territory. The drone campaign (peaking between 2009 and 2012) became a cause célèbre for anti-American sentiment. Pakistan’s media frequently highlighted stories of women and children victims of drone strikes, fueling public anger. By the mid-2010s, “drone” had become a dirty word in Pakistani politics – even leaders who privately tolerated the strikes (or recognized their efficacy against terrorists) publicly condemned them due to the strong public backlash (as revealed by WikiLeaks, Pakistani officials would complain about drones in public while tacitly allowing them in private) .

Notably, this issue reveals an interesting regional dimension: the communities directly affected by militant violence and drone strikes in the Tribal Areas (FATA) held somewhat nuanced views compared to the rest of the country. While the national narrative was uniformly against drone strikes, some surveys of locals in the tribal warzone found more mixed opinions. For example, a locally conducted poll in FATA in 2011 showed 63% of residents in the tribal areas said drone strikes are “never justified,” which still indicates a strong majority against them . However, when broken down by specific area, support for drones was highest in North Waziristan – the very district that experienced the most strikes . This hints that those who directly suffered under Taliban militants sometimes saw drones as the lesser evil. In fact, a ground-breaking study by researcher Aqil Shah involved interviews with displaced residents of North Waziristan in 2015: astonishingly, 79% of those local interviewees endorsed the drone campaign against militants . About 64% of them believed the strikes were accurately targeting militants, and most felt drones had “broken the back” of the Taliban in their area . They even preferred U.S. drones to Pakistani Army operations, which they said caused more collateral damage . These findings, however, stand in stark contrast to the nationwide sentiment, where concern for sovereignty and civilian harm predominated. Nationally, Pakistanis rally around the idea that drone strikes are an affront to Pakistan – a position held by both the public and all major political parties (including Imran Khan’s PTI, which led high-profile anti-drone protests). The nuanced local support in some conflict zones rarely makes headlines in Pakistan’s press, and thus the overarching public opinion remains that U.S. drone strikes were unacceptable. Even after the drone frequency declined (there have been no confirmed U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan since 2018), the legacy of anger persists. Many Pakistanis view the drone campaign as emblematic of American arrogance and disregard for Pakistani sovereignty.

Beyond drones, Pakistanis also heavily disapproved of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and related counterterrorism incursions. Surveys from the 2008–2015 period show that a majority of Pakistanis opposed the U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan and were skeptical of America’s motives. For instance, back in 2010 about 60% of Pakistanis said they opposed the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and considered the American war on terror more harmful than helpful . Many Pakistanis believed the war in Afghanistan destabilized their own country by driving militants and refugees across the border. There was also a common view that Pakistan was fighting “America’s war” at great cost in lives and money. Polls indicated fading enthusiasm for Pakistan’s own anti-terror campaigns when seen as done under U.S. pressure. In 2009, a slight majority (53%) of Pakistanis still supported using their army to fight extremists in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but by 2012 that support plummeted to 32% – reflecting war fatigue and backlash against being dragged into conflict . By the early 2020s, the sentiment solidified that Pakistan paid too high a price for cooperating with the U.S. after 9/11. The Pakistani public largely credits their own military operations (such as the 2014 Zarb-e-Azb offensive) for reducing terrorism, and they often accuse the U.S. of destabilizing the region and then “cutting and running.” The Western provinces (KP, FATA, parts of Balochistan) have been particularly vocal: tribal elders and local populations resent the infringement on their territory by U.S. forces (e.g., the Salala incident in 2011, when a U.S. airstrike mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on the Afghan border, caused nationwide outrage and a temporary blockade of NATO supply lines). All these factors mean that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are viewed very negatively. According to one Pew survey, roughly 3 in 4 Pakistanis (74%) agreed that America’s anti-terrorism policies “singled out” Muslim countries and that Pakistan’s partnership with the U.S. had contributed to domestic terrorism . Indeed, a majority of Pakistanis have blamed the surge of extremist violence in their country during the 2000s on Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. – believing that Pakistan became a target only because it sided with Washington .

In summary, public opinion across Pakistan is fiercely critical of U.S. counterterrorism actions in the region. Drone strikes, in particular, became a symbol of American injustice and are still remembered with anger by most Pakistanis (even though some local voices in drone-affected areas quietly acknowledged their effectiveness, this nuance is lost in the broader narrative). The entire “War on Terror” era left a legacy of mistrust: surveys in western provinces revealed fear and trauma among civilians living under drones , while national polls revealed a consensus that Pakistan should distance itself from U.S. military ventures. By 2025, with the U.S. war in Afghanistan over, Pakistanis largely feel relief that American forces are gone – but they remain wary that U.S. counterterrorism policies (e.g. pressure to “do more” against certain militants) could still harm Pakistani interests. Any discussion of cooperation with the U.S. on security is extremely sensitive domestically. Pakistani leaders have to calibrate counterterrorism cooperation very carefully, as the public sentiment is broadly against anything seen as allowing U.S. military footprint or oversight. Overall, the drone war and counterterrorism campaigns profoundly damaged America’s image in Pakistan, and polls from 2020–2025 indicate that this damage has yet to be undone: Pakistanis continue to view U.S. anti-terror efforts as heavy-handed, destabilizing, and disrespectful of Pakistan’s sovereignty .

Key Takeaways and Recent Polling Highlights

Unfavorable Opinions Dominant: Pakistanis hold a strongly unfavorable view of the United States. In the past few years (2020–2025), only on the order of 10–20% express a positive opinion of the U.S., while roughly 60–80% express a negative opinion . This overall sentiment has remained persistently negative, continuing a long-term trend. For instance, Gallup Pakistan’s 2022 survey showed about 72% of respondents consider the U.S. an enemy of Pakistan . Pew Research’s Global Attitudes polls have similarly found favorable views in the teens or single-digits and unfavorable views near three-quarters in Pakistan . These figures make Pakistan one of the most anti-American countries in the world in terms of public opinion.
Regional Variations: Anti-U.S. sentiment is nation-wide but most intense in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and former FATA (tribal areas), which directly experienced U.S. drone strikes and the spillover of the Afghan war. Regions like Punjab and Sindh also show majority negative views, though historically Sindh’s populace (and supporters of the Sindh-based PPP) have been slightly less hostile – e.g. Pew 2009 reported 28% favorable in Sindh vs. only 9% in NWFP . Balochistan and KP, being more conservative and conflict-affected, lean heavily anti-U.S. Virtually no region exhibits pro-U.S. majority sentiment; the differences are in degree, not direction. Urban centers may be marginally more open to the U.S. than rural border regions, but even in cities like Karachi or Lahore, sentiment toward U.S. policy remains largely negative according to recent polls (with large majorities distrusting U.S. intentions).
Social Divides: Anti-American attitudes span social classes, generations, and religious groups. Pakistan’s religiously conservative and poorer populations often view the U.S. through a prism of Islamic solidarity and sovereignty – seeing America as anti-Muslim or as a neocolonial interferer. Meanwhile, many educated or wealthier Pakistanis also dislike U.S. policies, citing moral inconsistencies (e.g., drone strikes killing civilians) . Conspiracy beliefs about the U.S. exist across demographics, though perhaps more prevalent among those with limited education. Youth, who make up a majority of Pakistan’s population, have grown up during the post-9/11 years of fraught U.S.–Pakistan ties; surveys suggest young Pakistanis are just as negative (if not more so) in their U.S. views as older citizens. In 2022, two-thirds of Pakistanis were under 30, and they have “lived through the strongest waves of anti-Americanism” – accordingly, their attitudes reflect those waves . No major demographic group in recent polling has a net favorable view of the U.S.; the negativity is broad-based.

Subject-Specific Perceptions

General Relations: A majority of Pakistanis believe the U.S.–Pakistan relationship is poor and that the U.S. cannot be trusted. Around 70–75% typically say the U.S. is more of an enemy than a partner . Few Pakistanis (~10–15%) think the U.S. considers Pakistan’s interests or is a loyal ally . This mistrust has been steady from 2001 through 2025, exacerbated by events like the bin Laden raid (2011) and perceived U.S. favoritism toward India . Only a minority (less than half) prioritize improving ties with the U.S. as of the 2020s, down from about 60% in 2009 .
Foreign Aid: Public opinion is skeptical of U.S. aid. In one survey, 40% of Pakistanis said U.S. economic and military aid has a negative impact, while only about 10% saw it as positive . Just 12% viewed American economic aid favorably and 8% viewed U.S. military aid favorably . The prevailing sentiment is that aid serves U.S. interests (or comes with strings) rather than genuinely helping Pakistan. Notably, support for U.S. assistance in fighting extremism has fallen: in 2009, 72% favored U.S. humanitarian aid to extremist-affected areas, but by 2012 only 50% did . Likewise, Pakistani support for receiving U.S. intelligence cooperation dropped over time.
Cultural Influence: American cultural products are popular among segments of Pakistan (fast food, movies, technology), but this soft power has not translated into improved overall sentiment. There is no direct recent poll percentage on cultural approval, but anecdotally American culture is consumed by many urban youth while American government is resented. The Stimson Center notes that Pakistan’s anti-Americanism is not due to radical ideological rejection of the West, but rather policy grievances . Thus, one can see pro-American pop culture trends coexisting with anti-American political views.
Economic Ties: Pakistanis generally rate China’s economic influence much higher than America’s. In global attitude surveys, China is viewed favorably by roughly 80% of Pakistanis, whereas the U.S. is in the teens . Many Pakistanis consider China Pakistan’s closest economic partner and doubt the U.S.’s willingness to aid Pakistan’s economy. When asked to name allies, China tops the list, and the U.S. often isn’t even in second place (countries like Saudi Arabia or Turkey are). No recent public poll was found giving an exact figure for “desire for economic ties with U.S.”, but the general trend is that Pakistanis prefer Chinese investment and see the U.S. as a less dependable economic friend.
U.S. Counterterrorism (Drone Strikes & War on Terror): Pakistan’s public overwhelmingly condemns U.S. counterterrorism operations on Pakistani soil. Approximately 3 out of 4 Pakistanis or more oppose U.S. drone strikes in the western provinces . For example, about 74% in a Pew survey said U.S. drones kill too many civilians , and only 17% approved of drone strikes even if coordinated with Pakistan’s government . Public support for the U.S.-led war on terror has been minimal – most Pakistanis wanted U.S. and NATO forces out of Afghanistan and felt that the Taliban regaining power next door was not necessarily Pakistan’s problem (only 25% in 2010 said a Taliban return in Kabul would be “bad” for Pakistan ). Pakistanis also became less willing to fight militants at home at America’s behest: those favoring using Pakistan’s own army in the tribal areas fell from 53% in 2009 to 32% by 2012 . The bottom line is that U.S. counterterrorism policy is deeply unpopular – it is seen as violating sovereignty and bringing violence into Pakistan.

Notable Changes Over Time

Over the last two decades, Pakistani public opinion of the U.S. has remained low but did experience some shifts in intensity. In the early 2000s, unfavorable views were already high (e.g. only ~10-20% favorable around 2002–2003 during the Iraq War fallout). Mid-2000s saw a brief improvement (favorability up to 27% in 2006 after U.S. earthquake aid) . However, after 2007 the trend went sharply downward: by 2011–2012 favorability was in single digits and “enemy” perceptions peaked (~74%) . The 2010s saw a slight recovery in favorability into the teens by 2014 , but still with a large majority negative. Pakistanis responded somewhat positively to the end of the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan (2014) – unfavorability toward the U.S. dropped a bit then – yet any goodwill eroded as new frictions (e.g. the Trump administration’s hard line in 2018) emerged. Importantly, through leadership changes in Washington (from Bush to Obama to Trump to Biden), Pakistani opinions didn’t swing as dramatically as in some other countries; they remained consistently poor, with slight upticks for Obama’s initial year that quickly vanished. As of 2023–2025, the data suggest no substantial improvement: Pakistani opinion of the U.S. under the Biden administration has not markedly warmed. In fact, Gallup’s global leadership survey indicates Pakistan is still among the countries with lowest approval of U.S. leadership (exact recent figures aren’t published, but historically Pakistan has been near the bottom). The ouster of Imran Khan in April 2022 – which he blamed on the U.S. – perhaps made things worse in the short term, as his followers intensified anti-U.S. sentiment in rallies . In sum, the key trend over time is that Pakistani antipathy toward the U.S. spiked during periods of intense U.S. military involvement and has remained high even after those conflicts wind down. Small positive blips (from aid or diplomacy) have not endured. The overall trajectory from 2001 to 2025 is one of entrenched skepticism and negativity, with the post-9/11 generation of Pakistanis as distrustful of the U.S. as the generation before – if not more so.

Sources: Recent public opinion data is drawn from surveys by reputable organizations such as Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project and Gallup Pakistan (the local affiliate of Gallup International). Key figures and trends are documented in Pew reports (2009, 2012, 2014) and analyses, as well as Gallup Pakistan polling releases and independent research. For example, Pew’s 2012 survey “Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.” provides many of the quantitative metrics on favorability, trust, and support for cooperation . The Stimson Center (2022) commentary on anti-Americanism in Pakistan cites Gallup Pakistan findings about perceptions of the U.S. as an enemy . Brookings Institution analyses (Madiha Afzal, 2013) shed light on how information about drone strikes influenced educated youth . Additionally, research by the Carnegie Endowment/Washington Post (Aqil Shah, 2016) provides insight into local opinion in Waziristan, highlighting the contrast between national and local views on U.S. drone operations . These sources collectively paint a consistent picture: from 2020 to 2025, Pakistani public opinion toward the United States remains highly unfavorable, with pervasive distrust shaped by regional experiences, social outlook, and especially long-running grievances over foreign policy and security issues. The data underscore that winning over Pakistani public sentiment would require significant changes in those underlying issues, as years of polls show quantitative evidence of hardened negative attitudes.